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NOTE

ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS
AND FREE SPEECH:
TOWARD A CONSISTENT
CONTENT NEUTRALITY STANDARD
FOR OUTDOOR SIGN REGULATION
Brian J. Connolly*
First Amendment challenges by billboard companies and other sign owners to
local sign regulations have become a frequent occurrence in the past thirty years.
The stakes are high for both commercial sign owners and local governments. Sign
control has emerged as an important front in the environmental protection
movement, as it focuses on the visual or scenic quality of the environment. Courts
have begun to recognize and accept local governments’ interest in controlling the
proliferation of signage as part of their efforts to improve environmental quality,
but courts have applied First Amendment doctrine in an inconsistent manner.
The courts’ inconsistent treatment of the constitutional requirement of content
neutrality has undermined state and local efforts to maintain aesthetic environments free from noxious signage. One of the consequences of this inconsistency is a
false sense of security among sign regulators that their content-based regulations
are somehow consistent with the First Amendment.
This Note argues in favor of a strict approach to content neutrality, placing a
greater burden on sign regulators to develop the most content-neutral ordinances
possible. The proposed approach would beat billboard companies and sign owners
at their own litigation game, limiting governments’ exposure to litigation and
lessening the risk of sign regulations being invalidated, which in turn denigrates
aesthetic quality. Furthermore, the recommended approach would reaffirm the
First Amendment rights of sign owners while ensuring that regulatory bodies
have sufficient guidance and encounter less risk in ensuring aesthetic environmental protection.

*
J.D. Candidate, December 2012. Special thanks are owed to University of Michigan professors Don Herzog and Noah Hall for their assistance on this Note, and to fellow
University of Michigan Law School student Maggie Mettler for her review and comments.
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INTRODUCTION
A familiar pattern has repeated itself in many communities throughout
the United States in the past thirty years. A commercial advertiser or billboard company seeks a permit from a local government to erect a sign along
a principal entry route into the community. Recognizing that such a billboard might pose a danger to the aesthetic character of the community by
blocking scenic views or by creating a garish landscape rife with commercial
advertising, the local government denies the permit, relying on its sign
regulations—often contained within the zoning ordinance—to support the
denial. In response to the denial of the permit, the billboard company sues
the local government, claiming an infringement upon the company’s First
Amendment right to free speech. Finding a violation of the First Amendment rights of the billboard plaintiff, a federal judge declares the local sign
ordinance invalid, leaving a regulatory vacuum that gives sign owners free
reign to place signs throughout the community.
The vast proliferation of billboards and other types of signage
throughout the United States is striking. In 2010, over 400,000 advertising
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billboards were estimated to exist along the highways and throughout the
cities of the nation.1 The billboard industry earned $4.8 billion in revenue
in the first three quarters of 2011,2 and it is not uncommon for a billboard
lease to cost an advertiser more than $2,500 per month.3 Billboards are
used most commonly for commercial advertisements, but are also frequently used for public announcements and advertising by nonprofit
organizations and government agencies.4 Billboards are typically more
common in areas where there is vacant land or where signage revenues
bring benefits to a property owner, such as rural areas or urban spaces that
have experienced significant poverty. In 1989, there were over 4,000 billboards in Detroit, Michigan, alone, with a disproportionate percentage of
the billboards located in lower-income neighborhoods of the city.5
While billboards bring significant revenue to advertisers, sign owners,
and property owners, they generally detract from the character of nearby
communities and have been shown to decrease values of surrounding properties.6 Today, approximately 700 municipalities nationwide have either
banned or severely curtailed billboard construction, and many communities
have shown increasing desire to regulate outdoor signage to limit the aesthetic impact such signs have on neighborhoods, business districts, and
rural areas.7
First Amendment challenges by billboard companies and other sign
owners to local sign regulations have become a frequent occurrence since
the Supreme Court first addressed the First Amendment rights of commercial sign owners in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego in 1981.8 The
1.
Ken Leiser, Digital Billboards: Bright or Blight?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec.
26, 2010, at D1.
2.
Out of Home Advertising Continues to Grow, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ASS’N AM.
(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.oaaa.org/press/pressreleases/news.aspx?NewsId=1332.
3.
BRIAN J. CONNOLLY & MARK A. WYCKOFF, MICHIGAN SIGN GUIDEBOOK: THE
LOCAL PLANNING & REGULATION OF SIGNS 3-2 (2011), available at http://scenicmichigan.org/
guidebook_2011.html.
4.
Id. at 3-2 to 3-3.
5.
Id. at 15-4.
6.
Billboards Hamper Economic Growth, SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org/billboardsa-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/104-billboards-hamper-economic-growth (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012).
7.
Billboard Control is Good for Business, SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org/billboardsa-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/100-billboard-control-is-good-for-business (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012).
8.
453 U.S. 490 (1981) (finding the City of San Diego’s sign ordinance unconstitutional on the grounds that it improperly distinguished among signs based on the content of
the messages displayed); see also John M. Baker & Robin M. Wolpert, The Modern Tower of
Babel: Defending the New Wave of First Amendment Challenges to Municipal Billboard and Sign
Regulations, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Oct. 2006, at 3, 3–4 (discussing the number of First
Amendment challenges to local sign regulations).
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stakes are high for both commercial sign owners and local governments.
The high value of outdoor advertising gives the commercial sign industry
significant incentive—and a great deal of money—to hire lawyers and challenge sign regulations. Between 2001 and 2006, over 100 cases were filed
against municipalities by outdoor advertisers around the nation,9 and these
challenges have continued unabated since that time. On the other hand,
governments have a myriad of regulatory interests in reducing the number
and size of outdoor signs.10 Local sign controls have frequently been justified on the basis of signs’ detrimental impact on traffic safety along
highways and streets.11 Furthermore, sign and billboard control has become
an important part of the environmental protection movement—in addition
to traditional issues, such as wildlife protection and land conservation—as
it focuses on the visual or scenic quality of the environment.12 Sign regulation is a key piece of the regulatory puzzle for states and local governments
to protect an important public good—the aesthetic quality of the natural
and built environments—from noxious intrusions by garish sign displays.13
Courts have begun to recognize and accept local governments’ interest
in controlling the proliferation of signage as part of their efforts to improve
environmental quality.14 In Metromedia, the Supreme Court officially endorsed aesthetic considerations as an acceptable rationale for regulating
outdoor signage, opening the door for federal courts—and many state
courts as well—to recognize aesthetic quality as an acceptable governmental
interest for sign regulation.15 In his dissenting opinion in Metromedia, Chief
Justice Burger wrote, “a legislative body reasonably can conclude that every
large billboard adversely affects the environment, for each destroys a
unique perspective on the landscape and adds to the visual pollution of the
9.
Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 4.
10.
See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 4-4 to 4-6.
11.
See, e.g., Jerry Wachtel, Digital Billboards, Distracted Drivers, PLANNING, Mar. 2011,
at 25.
12.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN & R. MATTHEW GOEBEL, AESTHETICS,
COMMUNITY CHARACTER AND THE LAW (Am. Planning Ass’n, Planning Advisory Service
Report No. 489/490, 1999); see also Billboards Degrade the Natural Environment, SCENIC AM.,
http://www.scenic.org/billboards-a-sign-control/the-truth-about-billboards/101-billboardsdegrade-the-natural-environment (last visited Sept. 16, 2012); 10 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-25
(2012) (protecting scenic views as part of state environmental law).
13.
See CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 4-2.
14.
Historically, courts required justifications for sign regulation based on community
health and safety, and did not accept aesthetics or environmental quality as sufficiently
closely related to community health and safety. See DANIEL MANDELKER ET AL., STREET
GRAPHICS AND THE LAW 78 (Am. Planning Ass’n, Planning Advisory Service Report No.
527, 2004).
15.
453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) (plurality opinion). Aesthetic interests were endorsed
as sufficient rationale for land use regulations in the Supreme Court’s Berman v. Parker
decision twenty-seven years earlier. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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city. Pollution is not limited to the air we breath [sic] and the water we
drink; it can equally offend the eye and the ear.”16
Therefore, two competing interests are at stake in sign litigation: the
ability of sign owners to exercise their First Amendment right to speak, and
the right of the public to a physical environment of high aesthetic integrity.
This Note explores the First Amendment requirement of content neutrality
as it applies to outdoor signs. Content neutrality is the constitutional requirement that government not regulate any aspect of the message of
speech and instead regulate only the physical—size, height, brightness,
etc.—aspects of speech.17 Content neutrality is frequently implicated in
First Amendment litigation over outdoor signage, but the courts’ inconsistent treatment of the doctrine has undermined state and local efforts to
maintain aesthetic environments free from noxious signage. This Note
argues in favor of a stricter approach to content neutrality, as opposed to a
functional content neutrality standard that allows regulation of signs based
on broad subject matter categories or locational context.18 This argument
places a greater burden on sign regulators to develop the most contentneutral ordinances possible. Although the proposed approach may appear
backward in light of the environmental interest in sign regulation and regulators’ desire to have sign regulations upheld, the proposed approach would
beat billboard companies and sign owners at their own game while limiting
governments’ exposure to litigation and lessening the risk of sign regulations being struck down, to the detriment of aesthetic quality. The
recommended approach would reaffirm the First Amendment rights of sign
owners while ensuring that regulatory bodies have sufficient guidance and
encounter less risk in ensuring aesthetic environmental protection.
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the concurrent developments of aesthetic regulation rooted in the state police power and the
content neutrality principle that developed within First Amendment law,
giving specific attention to Metromedia, the complicated Supreme Court
case where these two doctrines collided. Part II goes on to discuss the confusing aftermath of Metromedia and the growth of two distinct judicial
responses in the federal district and appellate courts to the content neutrality principle. There has been a divergence in the judicial treatment of sign
regulations, with some courts applying strict prohibitions against regulations that distinguish among signs based on content, and other courts using
a more relaxed standard. Parts III and IV argue that courts should adopt a
more uniform and strict content neutrality standard when reviewing sign
regulations. Part III looks at the judicial precedents that dictate such a strict
16.
17.
18.

453 U.S. at 560–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Part II.
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standard, while analyzing and rejecting arguments used by courts and
commentators in favor of more relaxed neutrality standards. Part IV addresses the practical rationales for a stricter content neutrality standard,
maintaining that a stricter standard would provide more predictability to
regulators and would limit the pattern of judicial strike-downs of sign ordinances that has occurred in recent years.

I. SIGN REGULATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEF HISTORY
This Part explores two twentieth-century developments in constitutional law, the rise of aesthetic regulation, and the clarification of the First
Amendment requirement of content neutrality, which have a significant
impact on governments’ ability to regulate outdoor signage. This Part briefly reviews the legal history of aesthetic regulation and explores the
development of the First Amendment doctrine of content neutrality. In
addition, this Part discusses the collision of these two constitutional concepts in the landmark sign regulation case, Metromedia.

A. Aesthetic Regulation
Sign regulation cases in the early part of the twentieth century focused
primarily on property rights issues associated with the display of signs on
private property,19 as opposed to the free speech concerns that dominate
today’s sign cases. The earliest sign regulation cases were rooted in municipal police power authority, with many state courts recognizing
governments’ authority to regulate the display of signs and other structures
on privately-owned land, as long as the regulations were passed for a legitimate governmental purpose such as health, safety, morals, or public
welfare.20 Sign regulation authority was impliedly affirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1926, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., when it

19.
See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); St. Louis Poster Adver. Co. v.
St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917);
St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911).
20.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 73 N.E. 1035, 1039 (Ill. 1905); St.
Louis Gunning Adver. Co., 137 S.W. at 947–49; Cream City Bill Posting v. City of Milwaukee, 147 N.W. 25, 28 (Wis. 1914). In Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., the court
recognized that public health concerns were a valid basis for regulation, but explained that
the sign ordinance in question did not further that interest. 74 N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905). These
cases rejected earlier decisions holding that regulation of sign displays on private property
necessarily effected an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law. See,
e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268
(N.J. 1905) (finding that the regulation in question was impermissible because it was not
within the police power of the state).
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held that land use regulations could be a valid exercise of state police power
furthering the public welfare.21
Early land use and signage cases did not contemplate aesthetics as sufficiently within the realm of public welfare to provide the sole rationale for
local land use regulations,22 even though aesthetic concerns were permitted
as a supplementary consideration for land use and sign regulations in some
states.23 In 1954, however, in Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court endorsed aesthetic quality as a valid rationale for land use regulation,24 and
many states began to follow suit.25 The Supreme Court’s recognition of an
aesthetic rationale for land use regulations effectively opened the door for
consideration of environmental concerns in developing zoning and sign
regulations.26

B. First Amendment and Content Neutrality
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence largely neglected the free speech implications of regulating permanent outdoor signage
before the late 1970s.27 The Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence had
long required viewpoint neutrality, meaning that a regulation could not

21.
272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
22.
See, e.g., Paterson Bill Posting, 62 A. at 268 (“Aesthetic considerations are a matter
of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the
exercise of the police power . . . .”).
23.
See, e.g., Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 271 N.W. 823, 825
(Mich. 1937).
24.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
25.
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561–62 (Mass.
1955); Gannett Outdoor Co. of Mich. v. City of Troy, 409 N.W.2d 719, 722–23 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. 1980); Pierro v. Baxendale, 118 A.2d 401,
408 (N.J. 1955); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222–
23 (Wis. 1955).
26.
See, e.g., Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean.”). Courts and the public now generally recognize aesthetic regulation—sign regulation
included—as a crucial part of creating a healthy visual, natural, and ecological environment.
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555–57 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing “the authority of local government to protect its citizens’ legitimate
interests in traffic safety and the environment by eliminating distracting and ugly structures
from its buildings and roadways”). Furthermore, Congress’s broad understanding of what
constitutes the environment for regulatory purposes supports an understanding of aesthetic
regulation as an environmental aim; the National Environmental Policy Act requires federal
agencies to use “all practicable means” to “preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012).
27.
See Randal R. Morrison, Sign Regulation, in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LAND USE LAW 109 (Daniel R. Mandelker &
Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001).
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control the display of messages containing a particular political viewpoint.28
However, in 1972, the Court expressly prohibited government regulation of
the content or subject matter of protected speech,29 such that the government may not impose differential burdens on speech based on its general
subject matter.30 The content neutrality principle grew out of a concern that
government action regulating speech based on its subject overcomes an
individual’s right to decide the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression or
consideration,31 and that government selection of subject matter offers the
significant potential for untrammeled discretion by government officials,
leading to the suppression of certain ideas.32 A content-neutral regulation is
deemed to be a “time, place, and manner” regulation, which regulates to
some extent the temporal, locational, and other non-speech aspects of protected speech.33 In the context of a sign, a time, place, and manner
regulation would focus on the sign’s placement, size, height, area, and
brightness, for example, instead of regulating the types of words or images
on the sign.
The development of the commercial speech doctrine was also critical in
bringing outdoor signage under First Amendment protection. Before 1976,
the Court did not afford First Amendment protection to commercial
28.
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
29.
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.” (emphasis omitted)). The distinction between viewpoint
neutrality and content neutrality was perhaps best articulated in Boos v. Barry, where the
Supreme Court struck down a Washington, D.C., ordinance that prohibited the display of
signs or other communicative devices critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of a
property used or occupied by any foreign government. 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (plurality
opinion). The Court stated that “a regulation that ‘does not favor either side of a political
controversy’ is nonetheless impermissible because the ‘First Amendment’s hostility to
content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.’
Here the government has determined that an entire category of speech—signs or displays
critical of foreign governments—is not to be permitted.” Id. at 319 (emphasis and internal
citation omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537
(1980)).
30.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47–48
(1987).
31.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (plurality opinion).
32.
Id. (“Laws [that are content-based] pose the inherent risk that the Government
seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion.”); see also
Stone, supra note 30, at 55–57.
33.
See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); see also Daniel R.
Mandelker, Sign Regulation and Free Speech: Spooking the Doppelganger, in TRENDS IN LAND
USE LAW FROM A TO Z: ADULT USES TO ZONING 70–71 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001) (“A
time, place, and manner regulation is a law that regulates activities to protect governmental
interests unrelated to speech. An example is an ordinance that contains limitations on the
size, number, and height of signs.”).
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speech.34 That notion was discarded, however, in the 1976 Supreme Court
case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,35 on the grounds that a democratic society has an interest in the “free
flow of commercial information.”36 The Court later clarified however, that
commercial speech enjoyed a lesser protection than other speech,37 and
adopted a four-part intermediate scrutiny test to deal with government
restrictions on commercial speech.38 Therefore, regulation of signs containing a commercial message will be reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny
test.
The first application of the commercial speech doctrine to outdoor
signage came in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, decided
in 1977.39 The Court invalidated an ordinance banning the display of outdoor real estate signs that was enacted out of local concern that a
proliferation of such signs would destabilize the local housing market and
encourage “white flight.”40 In invalidating the ordinance, the Court found
that the ordinance failed to offer ample alternative channels for communicating information on homes for sale,41 and that the ordinance was enacted
for the purpose of suppressing information.42 The Court held that the
township improperly restricted the free flow of truthful commercial information and had failed to show that the restriction was necessary to achieve
its goal of encouraging stable, racially-integrated housing.43 Although the
Court intimated some concern about the content neutrality of the ordinance in question, Linmark was decided based on the suppressive character
of the ordinance in question;44 the Court saved for another day the question
of whether a prohibition against real estate signs violated the requirement
of content neutrality.

34.
See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641–45 (1951); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
35.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
36.
Id. at 765.
37.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
38.
Id. at 563–64. The four-part Central Hudson test requires that the speech being
restricted be lawful and non-misleading, the regulations must be supported by a substantial
governmental interest, that the regulation directly further that interest, and that the regulation be no broader than necessary.
39.
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
40.
Id. at 87–91.
41.
Id. at 93.
42.
Id. at 93–94. In the Supreme Court’s eyes, the township’s declared purpose for
enacting the ban was that it feared that the signs’ “ ‘primary’ effect [is] that they will cause
those receiving the information to act upon it.” Id. at 94.
43.
Id. at 95–96.
44.
Id. at 95–97.
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C. Collision of Aesthetics and the First Amendment: Metromedia
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the First Amendment rights of
commercial advertisers and its application of First Amendment doctrine to
outdoor signs in Linmark was a turning point.45 In one fell swoop, the
Court handed billboard companies and commercial sign owners a new, First
Amendment-based litigation strategy to challenge municipal sign regulations.46 Decided just four years after Linmark, Metromedia was the first case
in which the Supreme Court considered First Amendment claims by billboard owners.47 In Metromedia, a billboard company successfully challenged
the City of San Diego’s sign ordinance, which prohibited the display of offpremises signs, with some exceptions.48 Despite the case’s importance as a
guidepost for sign regulation, the outcome of Metromedia was a confusing
and fractured49 five-part opinion, described by Justice Rehnquist as “a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly
drawn.”50
To the extent that conclusions can be found in Metromedia, a majority
of the justices agreed on three critical points.51 First, a majority found that
the city’s aesthetic concerns, which led to the enactment of the ordinance,52
served a substantial governmental purpose supporting regulations concern-

45.
See Morrison, supra note 27, at 109.
46.
See Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 3.
47.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Metromedia is universally recognized as the foundational case on sign law. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
LAND USE LAW § 11.13 (5th ed., 2003); Morrison, supra note 27, at 110.
48.
453 U.S. at 493–96 (plurality opinion). “Off-premises” is a classification that
applies to signs whose messages relate to an activity that is not conducted on the property
where the sign is displayed. Conversely, an “on-premises” sign has a message that relates in
some manner to the activities being conducted on the property where the sign is displayed.
Id. at 494.
49.
Morrison, supra note 27, at 106 (describing Metromedia as “an archetype of the
cloudiness that permeates the law of signs”); see also M. Ryan Calo, Scylla or Charybdis:
Navigating the Jurisprudence of Visual Clutter, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1877, 1879 n.18 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s divisions in Metromedia).
50.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51.
CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-3.
52.
The San Diego ordinance acknowledged that the city’s aesthetic concerns were
part of a set of broader environmental goals. The ordinance stated, “It is the intent of these
regulations to protect an important aspect of the economic base of the City by preventing
the destruction of the natural beauty and environment of the City, which is instrumental in
attracting nonresidents who come to visit, trade, vacation or attend conventions; to safeguard and enhance property values; to protect public and private investment in buildings
and open spaces; and to protect the public health, safety and general welfare.” Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1977) (quoting SAN DIEGO,
CAL., ORDINANCE 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972)).
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ing speech,53 thereby endorsing aesthetics as a proper governmental rationale for commercial speech regulations.54 Because the environmental and
aesthetic regulatory interests parallel one another,55 this Metromedia holding
was critically important for the regulation of signage on environmental
grounds. Second, a majority held that sign regulations must be contentneutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions,56 applying the content neutrality requirement to government regulations of outdoor signage.57 Third,
a majority agreed that a sign regulation may not favor commercial speech
over noncommercial speech either directly or indirectly,58 as this type of
regulation would constitute an impermissible content-based distinction.59
Thus, San Diego’s ban on off-premises signage violated the First Amendment because the ban prohibited commercial property owners from
displaying noncommercial signage unrelated to the activity on the property,
thereby effecting a content-based regulation favoring commercial speech
over noncommercial speech.60
One of the primary areas of post-Metromedia confusion surrounds the
type and degree of content neutrality required by the First Amendment in
the context of sign regulation.61 Although it restated the basic principle of
53.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507–08 (“[T]he twin goals that the ordinance seeks to
further—traffic safety and the appearance of the city—are substantial governmental goals.”).
54.
Aesthetic concerns are also a valid regulatory purpose for regulation of noncommercial speech, which requires a regulation to be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, in which aesthetic considerations are included. See Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Note that, in reviewing content-based
regulations, the Court applies strict scrutiny, which requires that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Members of City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 821 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 560–61 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56.
Id. at 516.
57.
The Metromedia plurality opinion suggested that ordinances could distinguish
among broad categories of commercial speech, id. at 512, but the concurrence strongly
rejected that notion. See id. at 536. The plurality’s observation seems to be at odds with the
Supreme Court’s earlier opinion demanding content neutrality in government regulations of
commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. See Virginia
Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
58.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. The reason that a ban on off-premises signage inherently favors commercial
speech was summed up well in Vono v. Lewis, in which the court, discussing a similar ban on
off-premises signage, stated, “The owner of a music store, to take one example, could not
replace her ‘Drums For Sale’ sign with a ‘Cut Property Taxes Now!’ message unless she
conducted some tax-related activity in the music store. So, while the drum seller . . . could
not advertise cars she also would be prohibited from expressing her strongly held views to
limit taxes, to stop the war, support a candidate, or root for the Red Sox.” 594 F. Supp. 2d
189, 203–04 (D.R.I. 2009).
61.
R. Douglass Bond, Note, Making Sense of Billboard Law: Justifying Prohibitions and
Exceptions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2482, 2507 (1990).
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content neutrality, the Metromedia plurality opinion endorsed two potentially content-based distinctions: the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, and the distinction between on-premises and offpremises signage.62 By resting its First Amendment analysis on San Diego’s
failure to accommodate noncommercial speech in places where commercial
speech was allowed, the plurality approved a bifurcated approach to sign
regulation based on whether the message of the sign is commercial or noncommercial in nature.63 Furthermore, by upholding an ordinance that
distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, the Court appeared to suggest that some degree of message-based regulation was
permissible under the First Amendment.64 Instead of requiring that sign
regulations be truly content neutral so as to reject any regulation of a sign’s
message, portions of the Metromedia opinion affirmed distinctions that
carry message-related implications for regulation.65 Metromedia’s effect,
then, was to call into question the Court’s prior content neutrality requirements—entering into murky territory where government officials could
potentially censor speech in the sign permit review process—and to create
confusion among courts, government regulators, and attorneys.
Metromedia stands as the foundational case in First Amendment sign
law, because it served as the intersection of the Supreme Court’s recognition of local governments’ land use authority premised on aesthetic
grounds, and the Court’s demands that regulations of speech contain no
reference to content. However, the confusing nature of the case’s outcome

62.
Calo, supra note 49, at 1881–82.
63.
See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting
the obvious problem with this approach, saying “an ordinance . . . banning commercial
billboards but allowing noncommercial billboards . . . raises First Amendment problems at
least as serious as those raised by a total ban, for it gives city officials the right—before
approving a billboard—to determine whether the proposed message is ‘commercial’ or
‘noncommercial.’ ”). Despite the Supreme Court’s dedication to delineating the commercialnoncommercial distinction, the Court has not articulated a precise delineation between
commercial and noncommercial speech.
64.
See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512. Courts since Metromedia have noted the inherent
content neutrality problem with the on-premises/off-premises distinction. See, e.g., Vono, 594
F. Supp. 2d at 200–01 (finding the distinction between on- and off-premises signage to be a
message-based distinction because the government must determine whether or not the
message relates to the premises); Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 132
P.3d 5, 16 (Or. 2006) (finding that the on-premises/off-premises distinction violates the
Oregon constitution’s free speech guarantee). At least one court has found that the onpremises/off-premises distinction does not violate the prohibition on content-based regulation because regulations containing such a distinction are regulating speech based on its
location, not its content; this is not widely followed. See generally, Mandelker, supra note 33,
at 76–77.
65.
See, e.g., Vono, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 200–01 (discussing the message-based distinctions in Metromedia).
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has plagued courts and commentators. The next Part explores a key division
on the content neutrality requirement that has taken place since Metromedia.

II. CRACKS IN THE CONTENT NEUTRALITY DOCTRINE
Because none of the opinions in Metromedia gained majority support in
the decision, the precedential value of the case as it pertains to sign regulation and the First Amendment is somewhat murky. Under the rule
articulated in Marks v. United States, lower courts are not bound by any
particular line of reasoning in plurality opinions such as Metromedia.66
Lower courts are, however, required to comply with the “position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.”67 Largely due to the confusion that resulted from the five Metromedia opinions, federal appeals courts have taken two decidedly different
directions in the degree of content neutrality required of sign regulations.68
One on hand, some courts have taken a “literal-minded”69 approach that
approximates complete neutrality, disallowing any regulation based on a
sign’s overarching subject matter,70 and some have even disallowed distinctions such as that between on-premises and off-premises signage.71 On the
other hand, some courts have taken a more relaxed—or functional—
approach, allowing regulations to distinguish between broad categories of
signage,72 and in some cases, allowing regulations to differentiate between
signs based on their relevance to the site at which they are located.73 This
division has widened dramatically over the past twenty years, with at least
two circuits subscribing to the stricter approach,74 and three circuits sub66.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
67.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976); see also Calo, supra note 49, at
1880–81.
68.
Susan L. Trevarthen, Best Practices in First Amendment Land Use Regulations, PLAN.
& ENVTL. L., June 2009, at 3, 8.
69.
Id.
70.
See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 736 (8th
Cir. 2011) reh’g en banc denied; Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266
(11th Cir. 2005). The regulations struck down in Solantic included broad category-based
distinctions, such as “identification” signs or “religious displays.” Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1257.
71.
See, e.g., Outdoor Media Dimensions v. Dep’t of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 16 (Or.
2006).
72.
See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622 (6th Cir.
2009) (upholding regulation containing differing regulations for “business” signs, “advertising” signs, and “political” signs).
73.
See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1064–65 (3d Cir. 1994);
Wheeler v. Comm’r. of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 1987).
74.
The Eighth, see Neighborhood Enters., 644 F.3d at 736, and Eleventh, see Solantic,
410 F.3d at 1266, Circuit Courts have led the charge toward a stricter approach. The First
Circuit generally follows this approach as well. See Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord,
N.H., 513 F.3d 27, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2008).
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scribing to the more flexible approaches.75 This Part explores the contextsensitive and category-based approaches (collectively, the “functional approach”), and contrasts these approaches to the strict content neutrality
approach.

A. The Functional Approach
The functional approach for determining the content neutrality of sign
regulations has two strands: one allows broad “category-based” determinations, and the other allows “context-sensitive”76 distinctions. The categorybased line of cases generally accepts that governments can regulate signs
according to broad, potentially subject-based categories of signs.77 Under a
category-based approach, a sign ordinance could potentially differentiate
between “political,” “real estate,” “construction,” “identification,” or “directional” signs, and such a differentiation would not run afoul of the First
Amendment.78 Chief Justice Burger’s Metromedia dissent supported this
model, as he would have upheld the San Diego ordinance on the grounds
that the broad categories of signs excepted from the ordinance were seemingly noncontroversial and had some rational relationship to the public’s
need for their regulation.79 Further support is found in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, where the Court appeared
to suggest that the content neutrality requirement was met simply when the
government’s regulatory interest was justified without reference to content.80
75.
The Sixth, see H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622, and Seventh, see Lavey v. City
of Two Rivers, 171 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir. 1999), Circuit Courts have allowed categorybased regulations. The Ninth Circuit has generally adhered to a stricter approach to determining content neutrality, although it has allowed some category-based restrictions in
certain cases. See G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir.
2006). The Third Circuit has also permitted signs in certain places based on their relevance
to the site at which they are displayed. See Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380,
389–90 (3d Cir. 2010).
76.
The term context-sensitive was coined in Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064, but this approach has also been titled the “site relevance theory.” Morrison, supra note 27, at 115.
77.
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 587 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2009);
H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622; S. Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 896–97 (7th Cir. 1991); Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 591.
78.
See Reed, 587 F.3d at 977; H.D.V.-Greektown, 568 F.3d at 622; Lavey, 171 F.3d at
1112 n.5; Wheeler, 822 F.2d at 591.
79.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 564–65 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Where the [San Diego] ordinance does differentiate among topics, it simply
allows such noncontroversial things as conventional signs identifying a business enterprise,
time-and-temperature signs, historical markers, and for sale signs . . . [It may be] frivolous
to suggest that, by allowing such signs but forbidding noncommercial billboards, the city has
infringed freedom of speech.”).
80.
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). This statement has been the subject of significant handwringing by the Supreme Court and lower courts. Compare the Court’s statement in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993) (noting that Cincinnati’s “mens
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The Court was silent as to whether the regulation was actually content
neutral.
Alternatively, courts following the context-sensitive approach to determining the validity of sign regulations acknowledge that some messages are
more important than others at certain locations81 in order to justify content-based exceptions to the general rule.82 This approach has roots in both
Justice Brennan’s concurrence83 and Chief Justice Burger’s dissent84 in
Metromedia, both of which noted that the communicative value of having
some signs at certain locations may outweigh the government’s interest in
aesthetics or traffic safety. A context-sensitive ordinance, in other words,
would “constitutionally contain content-based exceptions as long as the
content exempted from restriction is significantly related to the particular
area in which the sign is viewed—for example, a sign identifying the property on which it sits as a restaurant, or a sign alongside a highway which
tells drivers how to reach a nearby city.”85 The context-sensitive approach
certainly tolerates the on-premises/off-premises distinction86 and is openly
forgiving toward broad subject matter-based exceptions to general bans on
certain types of signage.87
Rappa v. New Castle County is a foundational application of both the
category-based and context-sensitive approaches.88 The case dealt with a
rea” in choosing between messages based on content was irrelevant), with its reaffirmation
of the Ward standard in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000) (plurality opinion).
81.
See, e.g., Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064–65; see also Jason R. Burt, Note, Speech Interests
Inherent in the Location of Billboards and Signs: A Method for Unweaving the Tangled Web of
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 2006 BYU L. REV. 473, 518–19 (2006) (advocating
the adoption of a context-sensitive approach in determining whether local ordinances meet
the content neutrality requirement of the First Amendment).
82.
Morrison, supra note 27, at 115.
83.
See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 532 n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
would allow an exception only if it directly furthers an interest that is at least as important
as the interest underlying the total ban . . . .”).
84.
See id. at 565 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he city reasonably could conclude that
the balance between safety and aesthetic concerns on the one hand and the need to communicate on the other has tipped the opposite way.”).
85.
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1047.
86.
See Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (1987) (“[T]he onpremises/off-premises distinction does not constitute an impermissible regulation of content
just because the determination of whether a sign is permitted at a given location is a function of the sign’s message.”).
87.
See Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1063–64. Exceptions to general bans on signs pose particular
problems when they are content-based; for example, a city that bans all temporary signage
but then allows an exception for “political” signs has made an exception based on the content—the political nature—of the sign’s message.
88.
Id. at 1043. Rappa has been followed and expanded upon by the Third Circuit in at
least two more-recent cases. See Melrose v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 389–90 (3d
Cir. 2010); Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 747–48 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Delaware law generally prohibiting signage within twenty-five feet of
highway rights-of-way.89 The law contained a number of exemptions from
the prohibition, including exemptions for “signs advertising the sale or lease
of the real property on which they are located” and signs advertising the
activities conducted on the property on which the sign is located.90 In reviewing the exemptions from the Delaware law’s prohibition, the court
relied upon Justice Brennan’s Metromedia concurrence, articulating a test
whereby an exemption from a total ban would need to directly further a
governmental “interest that is at least as important as the interest underlying the total ban,” in a way that was narrowly drawn and not more broad
than is necessary.91 The court then went on to determine that the government’s regulatory interest in allowing the communication of certain
information at certain places was at least as important as the government’s
regulatory interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, thus justifying the exceptions to the ban.92 The court noted, for example, that a speed limit sign
along a highway or an advertisement of a commercial establishment on the
property where the establishment is located are signs for which the governmental interest in allowing access to important information is
sufficiently important to overcome a general ban on roadside signage.93

B. The Strict Content-Neutral Approach
On the opposite end of the spectrum are courts that require sign regulations to be entirely content neutral, and which have invalidated any sign
regulation that deals with the subject matter or message of the sign.94 Un-

89.
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1051.
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 1064 (quoting Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490, 532 n.10 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). While exemptions from total bans attract significant attention
from courts because they are commonly content-based, total bans without exemptions may
also carry First Amendment problems if they may fail the narrow tailoring requirement of
the intermediate scrutiny test or may not leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See generally City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994); Cent. Hudson Gas
and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1980); Lusk v. Vill. of Cold
Spring, 475 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 2007); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid,
88 F.3d 382, 388–90 (6th Cir. 1996).
92.
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064 (“Some signs are more important than others not because
of a determination that they are generally more important than other signs, but because they
are more related to the particular location than are other signs.”).
93.
Id. The Rappa court struck down a portion of the Delaware law that exempted
signs advertising local cities and industries from the general ban, finding that the interest in
communicating such off-premises commercial advertisements was not more important than
the aesthetic and traffic safety interests that justified the underlying ban. Id. at 1068.
94.
See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (2005);
Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[O]nly the most
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der this approach, sign regulations that purport to regulate in any way
based on the subject matter of the sign, even if such regulations are based
on seemingly benign broad categories of subjects,95 are found to violate the
First Amendment. Courts following this stricter approach place a heavy
reliance on plain understandings of the Supreme Court’s blanket statements on the content neutrality requirement,96 first in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley,97 and later in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC.98 In
addition, some commentators and litigators, particularly billboard company
plaintiffs, have advocated an extreme approach—often termed the “need to
read” approach—that would invalidate a sign ordinance solely on the
grounds that a government enforcement official would need to read the
sign’s message to enforce the ordinance.99 Such an absolutist model has
been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court,100 and creates a nearabsurdity for practical regulatory purposes.101
The strict content-neutral approach was articulated in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,102 in which
the court invalidated a city ordinance based on its definition of “sign.” The
city code’s “sign” definition contained two exclusions from its scope, including an exclusion for the symbols or crests of civic organizations and an
exclusion for art works.103 The owner of a wall mural, which contained a
political message in addition to artwork, challenged the city’s enforcement
of its sign code against the mural, arguing that the ordinance was contentbased because it required city officials to review the sign’s content to determine whether the ordinance applied.104 The Court of Appeals agreed
with the sign owner, noting that the sign’s content was the determining
extraordinary circumstances will justify regulation of protected expression based upon its
content.”).
95.
See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54 F.3d 1400, 1404 (8th Cir. 1995)
(striking down an ordinance that created special restrictions for political signs).
96.
E.g., Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1258–59.
97.
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”).
98.
512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also Morrison, supra note 27,
at 108 (discussing the strict content-neutral approach articulated in Turner Broad. Sys.).
99.
Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 8.
100.
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–21 (2000) (plurality opinion).
101.
The impossibility of such an approach is exemplified by the fact that an enforcement official must at least look at an object to determine if the object falls under the
regulatory ambit of the sign regulation; definitions contained within the law would undoubtedly need to refer to some communicative elements within the borders of the sign. See id.
102.
644 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2011).
103.
Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031
(E.D. Mo. 2010).
104.
See Neighborhood Enters., 644 F.3d at 735–36.
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factor as to whether the sign was subject to the ordinance restriction, since
an enforcement officer was required to review the mural to determine
whether it was subject to the ordinance.105 Other courts following the strict
approach have invalidated sign ordinances that distinguish among “governmental” flags,106 “decorative flags,” “memorial signs,” “signs . . . directing
and guiding traffic,” and various other signs categorized based on the message of the sign.107 In some cases, courts applying the more literal
interpretation of content neutrality have noted that the on-premises/offpremises distinction is content-based because it is, in fact, a regulation of
the message of the sign.108
The more relaxed approach to content neutrality necessarily (and
courts applying this approach admit as much)109 affords the government the
opportunity to evaluate the content of a sign when enforcing a sign regulation, which is precisely the type of action that the First Amendment was
designed to prevent.110 Thus, the context-sensitive and category-based
approaches, which require less than complete content neutrality, offer
courts and governments a clear opportunity to derogate the content neutrality rule articulated by the Supreme Court. As long as courts and
governments continue to disagree over the degree of content neutrality
required by the First Amendment, billboard companies and other sign
owners will continue to have viable opportunities to challenge regulations
designed to improve the aesthetic integrity of communities. As this Note
discusses in the following sections, requiring governments to adhere to the
strictest form of content neutrality in developing sign regulations and
reinforcing the rigorous demands of the First Amendment is necessitated
by the Supreme Court’s unqualified statements on content neutrality, the
particular character of sign regulations as distinguished from other forms of
speech regulation, and by the practical effects of sign litigation.
105.
Id. at 736.
106.
See Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993).
107.
See Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1257, 1264 (11th Cir.
2005).
108.
See, e.g., Ackerley Commc’ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 88 F.3d 33, 36
n.7 (1st Cir. 1996) (“In ‘commonsense’ terms, the [on-premises/off-premises] distinction
surely is content-based because determining whether a sign may stay up or must come down
requires consideration of the message it carries.”). The stricter content neutrality approach is
also less forgiving to exceptions from general bans on signage, tolerating only those exceptions that are not based on the content of the message. See G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake
Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076–79 (9th Cir. 2006) (permitting content-neutral exceptions
from general sign ban).
109.
See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1047 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that
content-based regulation may be constitutionally permissible in some situations).
110.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640–41 (1994) (plurality
opinion).
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III. DOCTRINAL DEMANDS FOR THE
STRICT CONTENT-NEUTRAL APPROACH
Although the strict content-neutral approach places a great burden on
the governmental entities responsible for sign regulation, this approach is
the proper legal standard for judicial review of sign regulations. This Part
discusses relevant Supreme Court precedent demanding strict content
neutrality and the broadening of the content neutrality principle since its
inception in First Amendment jurisprudence. The uniqueness of sign regulation, and why its uniqueness reinforces the applicability of the approach,
is also addressed. Finally, this Part describes how the relaxed approaches
leave significant opportunity for erosion of the content neutrality principle
and thus a derogation of individual sign owners’ First Amendment rights.

A. Precedent and the Broadening Scope of Content Neutrality
Lower federal courts and state courts dealing with First Amendment
sign regulation challenges almost uniformly turn to the confusing Supreme
Court opinions in Metromedia for direction and precedent on sign regulation.111 However, the Court has issued more coherent articulations of the
content neutrality principle with more precedential value in defining a
content neutrality standard for sign regulations.112 Majority statements in
other Supreme Court cases113 preclude the application of the contextsensitive or category-specific approaches to content neutrality.114 Although
the Supreme Court has struck down decidedly content-based sign regulations since Metromedia,115 it has not upset any of its pre- or post-Metromedia
blanket statements holding that the First Amendment requires complete
content neutrality in the form of avoiding any message- or subject-based
regulation.116
111.
See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 69.
112.
See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
113.
See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978); Mosley,
408 U.S. at 96.
114.
The Court’s statements on the demands of content neutrality have not generally
contained exceptions to the general rule that speech regulations should not regulate any part
of the message of the speech. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 641–42 (discussing the
general rule, but noting the fact that narrow exceptions to the rule are recognized); Mosley,
408 U.S. at 95; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (expressing the general rule, but
noting limited exceptions).
115.
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(discussing the demands of content neutrality as reflecting “important insights into the
meaning of the free speech principle—for instance, that content-based speech restrictions
are especially likely to be improper attempts to value some forms of speech over others, or
are particularly susceptible to being used by the government to distort public debate”).
116.
See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Turner Broad.
Sys., 512 U.S. at 641–42.
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Even before Mosley, the Court declared that “governmental bodies may
not prescribe the form or content of individual expression.”117 The Court’s
first full-fledged discussion of the content neutrality concept in Mosley left
no room for error in condemning the speech regulation in question:
The central problem with [the] ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter . . . . The operative
distinction is the message on a . . . sign. But, above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.118
The Court then added,
[O]ur people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free
from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity
because of its content would completely undercut the “profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”119
Thus, in the Court’s first full statement on content neutrality, it did not
envision the relaxations and carve-outs that the functional approaches have
established.120
Since its initial recognition of the principle, the Court’s dedication to
content neutrality has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.121 In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, the Court wrote, “a constitutionally
permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either
the content or subject matter of speech.”122 The Court’s carefully-chosen use
of the term “subject matter,” distinguishable from its use of the term “viewpoint,” is perhaps the most clear suggestion that the Court envisioned a
broadly sweeping standard when reviewing speech regulations for content
neutrality;123 the holding reinforces the notion that the government has no
business regulating the message, or differentiating between messages and
categories, of constitutionally protected speech.124 The Supreme Court’s
117.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
118.
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added).
119.
Id. at 96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
120.
See id. at 95.
121.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663–64 (2011); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000) (plurality opinion); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 530, 536 (1980).
122.
Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.
123.
See supra note 29.
124.
See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536.
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broad statements on the absolute requirements of content neutrality thus
do not appear to line up with more lax applications of the content neutrality doctrine in some courts’ treatment of sign regulations following
Metromedia.
The Court’s recent handling of some previously acceptable contentbased distinctions points to a broadening scope of the content neutrality
principle. In particular, the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence
has called into question the commercial-noncommercial distinction upheld
in Metromedia.125 The Metromedia majority found that the commercialnoncommercial distinction was acceptable in the context of sign regulation126 over the cautious concurrence of Justice Brennan.127 In the context of
sign regulation, post-Metromedia courts dealing with the commercialnoncommercial distinction began to require that local sign regulations
contain “substitution clauses,”128 ordinance clauses which allow the substitution of noncommercial copy on any sign allowed in the jurisdiction.129
Courts continue to forbid any favoring of commercial over noncommercial
speech, and they almost always approve of ordinance provisions which offer
greater protection for noncommercial speech; thus, the substitution clause
is a modern requirement for sign regulations.130
The Supreme Court has, however, shown a recent willingness to grant
greater protection to commercial speech,131 and in at least one case has
required that commercial speech be regulated on par with noncommercial

125.
Morrison, supra note 27, at 110.
126.
See id. at 111–12. The Metromedia Court relied on its prior holdings relating to the
then-newly-articulated commercial speech doctrine to support the suggestion that a ban on
commercial signage that exempted noncommercial signage would be acceptable under the
First Amendment. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (noting
that the regulation in question passes the test set out in Central Hudson).
127.
See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 521–22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
commercial-noncommercial distinction was a violation of the Court’s aforesaid commitment
to content neutrality).
128.
See, e.g., Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 247–48 (9th Cir. 1988)
(striking down ordinance which failed to contain a clause permitting the display of noncommercial copy on any sign permitted in the city); Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764
F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1985) (striking down ordinance which clearly favored commercial speech
over noncommercial speech); cf. Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 611 (9th
Cir. 1993) (noting that ordinances contained substitution clause as required to be constitutionally permissible); Georgia Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46
(4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the inclusion of a substitution clause ensured that the ordinance
did not favor commercial speech); Major Media of the Se., Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d
1269, 1271–72 (4th Cir. 1986) (endorsing city ordinance provision which permitted the
display of a noncommercial message on any sign permitted in the city).
129.
Morrison, supra note 27, at 114.
130.
Trevarthen, supra note 68, at 9.
131.
See Morrison, supra note 27, at 110.
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speech.132 In Discovery Network, the Court dealt with a local ordinance in
Cincinnati that, in the interest of protecting and enhancing community
aesthetics, banned the on-street dissemination of commercial handbills
while concurrently allowing the dissemination of noncommercial handbills.133 After receiving notice from the municipal government that they
were in violation of the ordinance, commercial newsrack companies brought
suit on First Amendment grounds, and the Supreme Court ultimately
struck down the ordinance.134 Applying the Central Hudson commercial
speech test, the Court found that the ban on commercial newsracks did not
directly advance the city’s interest in aesthetics, in that noncommercial
newsracks were just as damaging to community aesthetics as commercial
newsracks.135 Furthermore, the Court found that the ordinance was clearly
content-based, because the determination as to whether a newsrack was
permitted was based on the content of the newspapers being distributed
from it.136 Discovery Network was the first time that the Court placed an
apparent limit on the distinction that could be drawn between commercial
and noncommercial speech,137 although it is presently unclear how far the
limit extends.138
Despite the Court’s suggestion that its holding in Discovery Network is
narrow,139 the holding is representative of an expansion of the content neutrality doctrine from the Metromedia days.140 Whereas the Metromedia
plurality determined that San Diego’s ban on offsite commercial billboards—a partial ban on advertising signage in the city—was not
impermissibly underinclusive because the ban furthered the city’s aesthetic

132.
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
133.
Id. at 413, n.3.
134.
Id. at 431.
135.
Id. at 418 (“We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider [safety
and community aesthetics] an insufficient justification for the discrimination against respondents’ use of [commercial] newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted
[noncommercial] newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of
newsracks on the city’s sidewalks.”).
136.
Id. at 429 (“Under the city’s newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls
within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack.
Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content
based.’ ”).
137.
See id. at 419 (“[T]he city’s argument attaches more importance to the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech.”).
138.
Mandelker, supra note 33, at 78 (noting that the Court intended for its Discovery
Network holding to be narrow, as a municipality may be able to justify differential regulation
of commercial and noncommercial newsracks).
139.
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428.
140.
See Morrison, supra note 27, at 116.
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and traffic safety goals,141 Discovery Network represents a clear departure
from Metromedia’s endorsement of a partial ban.142 By finding Cincinnati’s
favoring of noncommercial newsracks over commercial newsracks to be
content-based, the Discovery Network Court appeared to backtrack from the
Metromedia plurality’s endorsement of the distinction as a legitimate basis
for regulation.143 Furthermore, the commercial speech doctrine may be
undergoing further sterilization, given the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sorrell v. IMS Health, in which the Court reviewed a commercial speech
regulation under the standards typically applied to noncommercial
speech.144 Thus, by eliminating the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech and finding it to be content-based, Discovery Network dramatically expanded the scope of the content neutrality requirement
for speech regulation.145
The Court has continued to broaden the content neutrality doctrine
since Discovery Network,146 further intimating a desire for a stricter content
141.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
142.
See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 78.
143.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 514–15.
144.
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (addressing a Vermont statute restricting “detailing,” the
process by which pharmaceutical companies collect information on individual doctors’
prescription practices).
145.
Many courts and authors have refused to recognize Discovery Network as eliminating the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. See generally Morrison,
supra note 27, at 116–17. Furthermore, a number of cases have declined to extend the Discovery Network tailoring analysis to outdoor sign regulation, finding that partial sign bans (i.e.
on commercial billboards) have a noticeable impact furthering municipalities’ aesthetic
goals. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94, 108–09 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he City has a ‘sufficient basis’ to believe that the impact of the zoning
regulations [banning commercial billboards along city highways] will substantially advance
its proffered [aesthetic] interests.”); RTM Media, LLC v. City of Houston, 584 F.3d 220,
227 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Houston has demonstrated that its approach to ameliorating the
billboard problem is ‘carefully calculated’ and that, because of their number, commercial
billboards pose a greater nuisance than do noncommercial ones.”); see also Metro Lights,
LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[U]nlike, for instance, the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial newsracks in Discovery Network, here
there is ‘some basis for distinguishing’ offsite commercial signage concentrated and controlled at transit stops and uncontrolled, private, offsite commercial signage ‘that is relevant
to an interest asserted by the city’ . . . .”). Some commentators and courts have suggested
that the commercial speech doctrine should be abolished, and commercial speech granted
full First Amendment protection, on the grounds that commercial speech is difficult to
categorize and that there is no rationale for offering limited protection to truthful commercial information. See Morrison, supra note 27, at 110.
146.
See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J.
587, 589–91 (2000) (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)).
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neutrality standard. In Sorrell, the Court addressed a Vermont statute that
prohibited the sale, disclosure, and use of physician-identifying information
by pharmacies and pharmaceutical manufacturers in their marketing activities.147 The Court found the statute in question, a regulation of commercial
speech, to be content-based, because it would require an enforcement officer to determine whether the protected information was being used for
marketing or for some other use.148 Sorrell is notable, however, because the
Court stated explicitly—and did so multiple times throughout the opinion—that speaker-based commercial speech regulations were essentially a
form of content-based regulation,149 another departure from earlier holdings, which seemingly endorsed some element of speaker-based regulation
in the context of commercial speech.150 While some forms of speaker-based
regulation were always constitutionally suspect,151 courts had also tolerated
some degree of speaker-based regulation when the regulation was unrelated
to the content of the message being conveyed.152

147.
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. The Vermont statute in question was designed to cut
down on “detailing,” the process by which pharmacies sell information about doctors to
pharmaceutical companies, who in turn use such information to gain advantage in their
marketing tactics directed toward specific doctors. See id. at 2659–60.
148.
See id. at 2663 (“[T]hose who wish to engage in certain ‘educational communications’ . . . may purchase the information. The measure then bars any disclosure when
recipient speakers will use the information for marketing.”).
149.
See, e.g., id. at 2665 (“Both on its face and in its practical operation, Vermont’s law
imposes a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker.”). The
Court explains the speaker-based problem with the Vermont law by showing that a certain
group was singled out as being unable to obtain and use information about doctors, while
other groups (i.e. non-detailers) could obtain and use the information. Id. at 2667. Although
the Court was concerned about speaker-based regulation, the problem could have also easily
been analyzed as an under-inclusivity problem.
150.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658–59 (1994) (plurality
opinion). Speech regulations that were effectively speaker-based have been upheld in the
context of outdoor sign regulations where the regulation imposed different speech regulations based on the land use of the property where a particular business was located, see, e.g.,
Paradigm Media Grp., Inc. v. City of Irving, 65 F. App’x 509, at *3 (5th Cir. 2003), or even
where the regulation differentiated among different industrial sectors’ ability to post outdoor signage, see G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076–77 (9th Cir.
2006).
151.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010)
(plurality opinion) (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too
often simply a means to control content.”).
152.
See id. (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate
to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”). The Supreme Court had previously
suggested that speaker-based regulation was only suspect where the government had some
preference or aversion to the message that the speaker was communicating. See Turner Broad.
Sys., 512 U.S. at 658.
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Thus, since Metromedia, there has been a gradual increase in the degree
of content neutrality required of governmental regulations of speech. This
gradual increase suggests that, to comply with the Supreme Court’s recent
statements on content neutrality, the content neutrality requirement in sign
regulation should be more stringent, instead of less stringent as desired by
the context-sensitive and category-based schools. These pushes toward
increased content neutrality and further sterilization of the government’s
ability to pick and choose between different forms of speech suggest that
the context-sensitive model for outdoor sign regulation has a limited future.

B. Carve-outs from the Content Neutrality Doctrine: False Alarms
Although the Supreme Court has firmly established the content neutrality requirement in its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has
relented on some aspects of content review in speech regulation. This Part
will discuss some of these aspects of content review, and will endorse the
idea that, where the Court has permitted some degree of content review, it
is inapplicable to sign regulation, and therefore sign regulation requires a
strict degree of neutrality. Three “exceptions” to the rule on content neutrality, which have been used on occasion to support a context-sensitive or
category-based approach to the principle, are discussed herein.

1. Unprotected Speech: Obscenity and Fighting Words
The Court has recognized that a limited number of cases and categories
of speech fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, thus allowing
the government to regulate such speech based on its content.153 These exceptions have been very limited and have been reserved for fighting
words154 or obscene forms of speech.155 Furthermore, a lesser degree of First
Amendment protection is afforded to speech that may have potentially
153.
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
154.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
155.
See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(“[W]e recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic
materials that some arguably artistic value, [but] it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude . . . . Even
though the First Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression,
we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.”); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding speech to be obscene based on: “(a) whether ‘the average
person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value” (citations omitted)).
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damaging secondary effects on nearby people and communities.156 The
Court’s analysis of these exceptions is not an undermining or carving-out of
the content neutrality principle, but rather recognizes a limitation on the
constitutional protection offered to certain forms of speech, based either on
its content or the consequences of certain forms of content.157 In other
words, if speech has the full protection of the First Amendment, it must be
regulated in a content-neutral way. Furthermore, the Court has carefully
noted that governments’ ability to engage in content review has become
more limited, not more expansive over time,158 and forms of speech traditionally offered less constitutional protection have gained greater protection
over time.159 While the Court recognized that the content of speech must at
times be examined in order to determine whether speech is constitutionally
protected,160 it has otherwise remained committed to its statements that
reviewing content is off-limits.

2. Metromedia Distinctions
Courts that have adopted the context-sensitive or category-based approaches to sign regulation have done so on the grounds that Metromedia,
by endorsing the on-premises/off-premises distinction,161 offers leeway for
the creation of a more relaxed content neutrality standard.162 However,
despite the confusion in Metromedia arising from the application of the
content neutrality doctrine to the on-premises/off-premises distinction,163
156.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (“[A]t least
with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed
under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations.”).
157.
See Young, 427 U.S. at 70.
158.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
159.
The offering of greater constitutional protection to types of speech that traditionally were afforded less protection is not limited only to obscene or explicit speech. See, e.g.,
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
160.
See Young, 427 U.S. at 71–72. Young touches on the obvious limit to an absolutist
application of the content neutrality doctrine described in footnote 101: the determination of
whether an object constitutes speech of the type and nature protected by the First Amendment may require at least a cursory examination of the object’s content. See id.
161.
See Metromedia, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (plurality opinion).
162.
See, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1063 (1994). The Rappa court
makes the further observation that the content-based exceptions in the law in question “are
quite small,” and that “they are not for particular subjects likely to generate much debate and
so are not likely to focus debate on that subject matter at the expense of other subject matter; and they do not discriminate by viewpoint.” Id. The Supreme Court has never suggested
that the likelihood that the speech would be the subject of debate was of concern in determining the constitutionality of a speech regulation, and the Supreme Court has explicitly
held that content neutrality is required in addition to viewpoint neutrality. See Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (plurality opinion).
163.
See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 75.
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the Metromedia opinions remained clear on the Court’s continued commitment to an exacting degree of content neutrality.164 Even though the
opinions were divided on whether the on-premises/off-premises (and commercial/noncommercial) distinction contained in the San Diego ordinance
in question violated the content neutrality doctrine,165 the Court did not
hold in favor of a context-sensitive approach that would reject the foundational doctrine of content neutrality.166 In fact, the plurality opinion does
not suggest167 that the Court understood the on-premises/off-premises
distinction to be a time, place, and manner distinction, as opposed to having any bearing on content.168

C. Signs as a Unique Mode of Expression
The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that different modes of
expression warrant different applications of First Amendment doctrine.169
Supporters of the more relaxed content neutrality standard discussed above
place heavy reliance on cases dealing with forms of expression outside of
sign law, relying principally on Hill v. Colorado170 to support this position.
Signs’ uniqueness as a mode of expression and the impracticality of reliance
on Hill are discussed herein.
Hill, which is one of the Supreme Court’s most recent articulations of
the content neutrality standard, dealt with a Colorado statute that prohibited, in areas near the entrance to a health care facility, a person to approach
within eight feet of another person without the consent of the other person
for the purpose of engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.171 One
of the challenges brought against the statute was that it was unconstitutionally content-based, on the grounds that an officer enforcing the statute
164.
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)) (“[T]he city may not choose the appropriate subjects for public
discourse: ‘To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would
be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.’ ” (emphasis added)).
165.
Compare Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–13 (plurality opinion), with id. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 540–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); and id. at 559–61 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
166.
Only Justice Brennan’s concurrence, id. at 528, and Chief Justice Burger’s dissent,
id. at 565, suggested the possibility of a context-sensitive approach to sign regulation; this
was not a majority of the Court.
167.
See id. at 510–12; see also Mandelker, supra note 33, at 76–77.
168.
Id.
169.
See infra discussion in note 179.
170.
530 U.S. 703 (2000).
171.
Id. at 707 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs in the case were a group of antiabortion protesters; the statute would have banned the protesters from approaching within
eight feet of individuals receiving medical treatment, including abortions, outside abortion
clinics. See id. at 708 (plurality opinion).
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would sometimes be required to listen to the content of a person’s language
in order to determine whether the person was engaging in oral protest.172
The Court found that the statute was content neutral.173
In determining that the regulation in Hill fit within the bounds of content neutrality required by the First Amendment, the Court observed—
somewhat oddly—that enforcing the statute in question would not necessarily require the enforcing officer to listen to the words spoken to
determine whether a speaker was approaching a listener for the purpose of
engaging in oral protest.174 In addressing the issue of determining a speaker’s purpose in approaching a listener, however, the Court noted that it
might be necessary for the enforcing officer to make a cursory review of the
content of the speech, if only to determine that the speaker’s approach of
the listener is regulated under the statute.175 This suggestion—that some
review of content is permissible—motivates much of the context-sensitive
and category-based approaches.176
The more functional approaches to content neutrality misplace their
reliance on Hill for a variety of reasons. Foremost among these reasons is
the fact that application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hill, a case
that dealt with oral communication,177 is inappropriate in the context of
determining whether a municipal sign regulation is content based.178 While
it would be inappropriate to suggest that courts determining the constitutionality of a sign regulation should not consider First Amendment law as
applied to other modes of communication, the concern over an oral speaker’s constitutional rights in Hill and the potential constitutional issues that
172.
See id. at 720.
173.
Id. at 723–24 (observing that the statute “places no restrictions on—and clearly
does not prohibit—either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed
by a speaker . . . . Instead of drawing distinctions based on the subject that the approaching
speaker may wish to address, the statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights
activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries. Each can attempt to educate
unwilling listeners on any subject, but without consent may not approach within eight feet
to do so.”).
174.
Id. at 721 (“With respect to the conduct that is the focus of the Colorado statute,
it is unlikely that there would often be any need to know exactly what words were spoken in
order to determine whether ‘sidewalk counselors’ are engaging in ‘oral protest, education, or
counseling’ rather than pure social or random conversation.”).
175.
Id. at 721–22.
176.
See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622–23 (6th
Cir. 2009) (upholding a city sign ordinance that distinguished among “advertising,” “business,” and “political” signs based in large part on the subject matter of the signs); Covenant
Media of S.C. v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Burt,
supra note 81, at 523.
177.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707.
178.
See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1981)
(plurality opinion).
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would arise from a municipal sign regulation are of a completely different
nature.179
The purpose of the statute at issue in Hill was to protect the privacy interests of individuals receiving medical treatment; the concern was that
such individuals would become “unwilling listeners” mobbed by protesters
while entering or exiting a health care facility.180 In the case of a speaker
and listener, as in Hill, two distinct individual rights are at odds with one
another: the right of the speaker to express his or her views, and the right
of the unwilling listener to maintain his or her privacy.181 The statute was,
in essence, concerned with the speaker’s conduct or intent, because in order
to fall under the auspices of the statute, the speaker would need to knowingly approach within eight feet of the listener for the purpose of oral protest,
education or counseling.182 The determination of the speaker’s purpose was
thus critical to application of the statute in question: if the speaker were
prohibited from speaking at all, he or she would be deprived of a First
Amendment right, while if the speaker were authorized to speak with impunity, the listener’s right of privacy would be violated.183 As the Court
noted, it could be possible to determine an oral speaker’s purpose in speaking to another person based on such factors as the intonation of the
speaker’s voice or the speaker’s manner of approaching the other person,
but at times, it may also be necessary to undertake a cursory review of the
speaker’s words to determine whether or not the statute applies to the
speaker.184
Signs are a different matter. There is almost no conceivable situation in
which a sign affixed to the ground and regulated by a municipal sign ordinance could possibly infringe upon an individual’s privacy interest in a
fashion similar to that of an oral protester who knowingly approaches within close range of another person. To protect the privacy interests of an
individual while balancing an oral speaker’s countervailing interest in free
179.
In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
different modes of communication warrant different legal treatment, given the vast differences that exist between the modes and the implications of such differences for the potential
deprivation of a speaker’s constitutional rights. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501 (“Each
method of communicating ideas is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the ‘differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers’ of each method.”) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems.” (emphasis
omitted)); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (“Each method [of
expression] tends to present its own peculiar problems.”).
180.
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
181.
Id. at 714–16.
182.
Id. at 707.
183.
See id. at 718.
184.
Id. at 721–22.
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speech, the speaker’s purpose is a critical determination that may at times
require a cursory review of the content of the speech, but this analysis is
dramatically different in the context of sign regulation.185 First, the interest
being protected counter to the sign owner’s First Amendment right is a
public interest in traffic safety and environmental aesthetics, not an individual right of privacy. The purpose of a sign, as opposed to its physical
characteristics, is largely irrelevant when the placement of the sign is being
considered in light of its impact on the aesthetic character of a community.186 For example, a sign can be regulated based on its face area, height,
setback from street frontage, placement on the property where it is located,
brightness of its lighting, or the materials used in the sign’s construction, all
of which further the public’s aesthetic regulatory interest.187 No matter
what the sign’s message, a large, bright sign could offend community aesthetics; on the other hand, a small, pleasantly-designed sign could further
the aesthetic interest, despite a message that might be objectionable to
some community members.188 None of the physical characteristics described above, which form the central problem in aesthetic concerns, have
anything to do with the message or subject matter of the speech. Furthermore, physical characteristics offer a much more definite and contentneutral basis on which an enforcement official can enforce the sign ordinance, as compared to regulating the manner in which an individual whose
protesting activities may harm another individual.
Moreover, a sign’s “conduct” is of a very different character than a
speaker’s conduct. An oral speaker may either speak or not speak. If the
First Amendment protects the oral speaker’s speech,189 then a regulator
185.
See id.
186.
Of course, signs that contain content lying outside the boundaries First Amendment protection and offensive to community morals, such as obscene words and images,
would be possible to remove on the basis of their obscenity. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
187.
See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2.
188.
While it is perfectly true that the message of a sign often lays the groundwork for
community outrage and subsequent regulation, any arguments that would support sign
regulation on the basis of community disagreement must fail under the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). A line of cases has outlawed the “heckler’s
veto,” whereby disagreement with a particular message is a proper basis for silencing it. See,
e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). The First Amendment itself was adopted out
of the Framers’ concern that an unrestrained majority could silence or coerce minority
groups, cutting them out of pluralist debate. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
189.
Some speech falls outside the boundaries of the First Amendment because its
particularly offensive or condemnable content may lead to immediate adverse and potentially dangerous reactions by listeners or witnesses. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 34–35;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
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must also have some means by which to protect the constitutional rights of
the listener if those rights are so implicated. Thus, the speaker’s intonation,
physical actions, and purpose are the only constitutional bases upon which
to regulate the speech without regulating based on content.190 On the other
hand, a sign’s “conduct” can be far more easily described in terms of its
physical characteristics, such as its size, height, placement, lighting and
design.191 Additionally, although an enforcement officer could determine
that a speaker was engaged in oral protest on the basis of the speaker’s
intonation or manner of approach, none of the physical characteristics of
signage, such as its size, height, placement, lighting or design, provide a
similarly content-neutral opportunity to determine the sign’s purpose. On
the contrary, the only way to determine that a sign is placed for oral protest
is by reading its message. One would be hard-pressed to regulate signage
based on its purpose without engaging in the type of content-based, subject-matter regulation that the Supreme Court has repeatedly proscribed.192
The Supreme Court’s pre- and post-Metromedia statements on speech
regulations and content neutrality do not qualify or limit the First
Amendment’s demand for completely content-neutral sign regulations. The
doctrine of content neutrality was developed without the suggestion that
government would consistently need to make determinations on a message’s
legality based on readings and analysis of its content. Metromedia confused
the principle of complete content neutrality by endorsing distinctions between on-premises and off-premises signage, and commercial and
noncommercial signage, which may be characterized as inherently contentbased distinctions. Although Hill endorsed an occasional cursory review of
content to determine whether speech was covered by a particular regulation, the case confused the doctrine, and the holding cannot be extended to
sign regulation because of the vast disparities between oral communication
and fixed and written outdoor materials.

D. Erosion of the Content Neutrality Principle
Under the Relaxed Approaches
Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the context-sensitive and category-based approaches is the possibility for erosion of the content neutrality
doctrine itself, to the detriment of the First Amendment rights of individual sign owners and speakers generally. To illustrate the basis for this concern
requires a brief review of the purposes behind the First Amendment and
190.
See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 721 (explaining that speech can constitutionally be
regulated based on purpose).
191.
See Mandelker, supra note 33, at 70–71.
192.
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 723.
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the content neutrality doctrine generally, as articulated throughout the
history of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Framers of the Constitution viewed the First Amendment and its
guarantee of freedom of speech as fundamental to the functioning of a
democratic government.193 Indeed, the Court has consistently recognized
that more speech, not less, is central to the creation of civil discourse194 and
that a society informed through speech has a greater likelihood of promoting a free democracy than a society in which speech and information are
suppressed.195 Therefore, the Supreme Court has taken pains to maintain
that freedom, even while recognizing that some elements of speech and
expression may be less worthy of constitutional protection since such elements are not integral to democratic government.196 The Supreme Court
has struck down laws that have the effects of coercing speech,197 censoring
speech,198 and chilling speech,199 as well as laws that allow administrative
discretion as to the legality of speech200 and that effect outright suppression
of speech.201
To maintain the essential freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, the Court has recognized that government regulation of content
would open up a strong possibility that speech would be chilled, coerced, or
suppressed.202 In Mosley, the Court said:
193.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
194.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“The First Amendment affords
the broadest protection to . . . political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ ”
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government.”); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[The
Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile.”).
195.
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–13
(1969).
196.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34–35 (1972) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (fighting words); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (incitements to violence).
197.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
198.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
199.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)
200.
See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
201.
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
202.
See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (“[N]othing in our precedents suggests that a
State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.”);
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (“[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
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To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and
to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content
control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”203
Thus, the Supreme Court recognizes that an exacting degree of content
neutrality is a linchpin in the flourishing of open, democratic government.204
Given these motivations behind the content neutrality principle, it is
clear that the functional approaches to sign regulation carry the significant
likelihood of an erosion of the First Amendment rights of individual sign
owners. By giving a government official or entity the opportunity to make a
determination that some signs are more important than others at particular
locations, the Rappa framework allows the content of a sign’s message to be
scrutinized to the extent that a speaker may be barred from the exercise of
his or her constitutional rights on vague grounds.205 Furthermore, a category-based approach offers further opportunity for government to censor
speech based on its content; an ordinance that makes special provisions for
political signs requires government officials to make determinations as to
what constitutes political speech. It is precisely these examples of government discretion that the content neutrality principle, and by incorporation
the First Amendment, have endeavored to avoid.206
While the environmental and aesthetic concerns that undergird much
of outdoor sign regulation are valid concerns, the First Amendment rights
guaranteed to individuals are central to the proper functioning of a democparticular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 217 (1983) (explaining the debate-distorting impact of content-based
regulations).
203.
Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
204.
The Supreme Court has maintained its stance that any content bias in government regulations of speech carries the possibility of infringement upon core First
Amendment rights, and thus may trample upon one of the hallmarks of the American
democratic system. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534–35
(1980).
205.
See Melrose v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 384 (2010). An administrative
official’s determination between an advertising sign, business sign, or identification sign in
Melrose could have made the difference in a business owner’s being able to place a sign on
her premises.
206.
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95–96.

Connolly_Final_WEB

218

1/22/2013 1:44 PM

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 2:1

racy. The Constitution does not place environmental protection efforts
through outdoor sign regulation above the guaranteed rights of individuals
to self-expression; accommodation of the individual right to free expression
must therefore be made if sign regulations are to be found constitutional.
This Part has thus demonstrated that the context-sensitive and category-based approaches to content neutrality are improper given the Supreme
Court’s precedent and the historical trajectory toward greater content neutrality. This conclusion is further dictated by the fact that the Supreme
Court has reserved very limited carve-outs to the neutrality principle,
largely saved for cases in which a regulator must determine whether the
speech in question falls under the protection of the First Amendment.
Finally, the context-sensitive and category-based approaches run the substantial risk of eroding the First Amendment rights of sign owners, which
is intolerable even in light of the valid public interests implicated in aesthetic regulation.

IV. THE STRICT APPROACH TO CONTENT NEUTRALITY:
DEMANDED BY PRACTICAL NECESSITY
Practical considerations for sign regulation, including improved environmental aesthetic integrity in the long run, demand a clearer neutrality
standard, applied to outdoor sign regulation, that does not waver in its
application of the content neutrality principle. The notion that a more
vigorous content neutrality requirement in sign regulation would provide
greater protection for the aesthetic quality of the environment is admittedly
backward-seeming, given that the litigation strategy of the billboard companies is to routinely demand greater neutrality while local governments
rely on relaxed interpretations of the content neutrality principle to deny
sign permit applications.207 The fact remains, however, that billboard companies and sign owners use content neutrality as the crux of their First
Amendment claims because sign regulations are quite frequently not content neutral, creating an easy argument to block enforcement of a sign
ordinance.208 There exists a widespread mistaken belief that content-based
sign regulations are the only means by which communities can accomplish
their aesthetic goals. This belief exists because it is conceptually easier to
identify and regulate problems with intuitive but content-based regula207.
Baker & Wolpert, supra note 8, at 8.
208.
Billboard plaintiffs generally argue in favor of a very stringent “need to read”
approach to sign regulation, which goes beyond the approach being advocated in this Note.
Id. It would be completely impossible to require a “need to read” approach, because it would
then preclude governmental officials from even determining whether a sign is truly a sign;
however, avoiding a “need to read” approach does not necessarily bring the content neutrality determination into a context-sensitive approach.
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tions—such as a community with a political sign proliferation problem
simply restricting the timeframe when political signs may be displayed209—
instead of using a more content-neutral form of regulation. Governments
are thus boxed into the corner of defending ordinances that regulate on the
basis of subject matter, and must hide behind arguments in favor of the
context-sensitive approach to the First Amendment in order to protect
their laws from being struck down.210
The relaxed content neutrality approaches to reviewing outdoor sign
regulations frequently benefit government regulators, since the common
result of a context-sensitive or category-based review of a sign ordinance is
the upholding of the ordinance.211 Thus, governments and environmentalists have cheered on the courts taking a less hard-line approach to the
content neutrality requirement of the First Amendment, under the mistaken impression that a more relaxed content neutrality analysis will benefit
their cause. And in fact, a more relaxed content neutrality analysis has
given immediate benefit to the cause of government and the pro-regulatory
community. But these immediate benefits are pyrrhic victories; with them
has come long-term uncertainty and a legacy of vague boundaries as to the
degree of content that governments may regulate,212 leaving open the distinct possibility for additional sign industry challenges to sign regulations
further down the road. These victories have come at high litigation costs to
local governments, and environmental advocacy organizations have committed significant resources in litigation to support the regulatory efforts of

209.
See, e.g., Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54 F.3d 1400 (1995). There are
numerous other examples of local governments employing “intuitive” but content-based
approaches to sign problems. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1981) (plurality opinion) (striking down a general ban on off-premises billboards that was
intended address a billboard proliferation problem); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune
Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (striking down sign regulations that created contentbased exemptions); Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (1993) (striking down an
exemption for “governmental” flags in an ordinance that otherwise prohibited flags); State v.
DeAngelo, 963 A.2d 1200 (N.J. 2009) (striking down an ordinance that prohibited inflatable
and portable signs, with limited exceptions).
210.
See, e.g., Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 1998); Whitton, 54
F.3d at 1403; Fehribach v. City of Troy, 341 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
211.
See, e.g., Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 383, 389–90 (3d Cir.
2010); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622–25 (6th Cir. 2009);
Riel v. City of Bradford, 485 F.3d 736, 753–54 (3d Cir. 2007); Wheeler v. Comm’r of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 589–90 (6th Cir. 1987). Note that the approach taken in Rappa did not
actually benefit the defendant state, since a portion of the regulation was struck down on
other grounds. See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1068 (3d Cir. 1994).
212.
See Trevarthen, supra note 68, at 8. The instability of the federal courts’ treatment
of content neutrality has contributed to the problem, providing little to no guidance on the
actual degree of content neutrality required of local regulations. Id.
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local governments that employ some obviously content-based distinctions
in their sign ordinances.213
The practical argument for a clearer content neutrality requirement is
thus straightforward: as long as governments believe they can get away with
content-based distinctions in their ordinances, content-based sign regulations will continue to be challenged in the courts. The lack of certainty over
the requirements of content neutrality will continue to result in many ordinances being struck down. A clearer content neutrality regime, even if it
imposes more rigorous up-front requirements on ordinance drafters, will
provide certainty to regulators, encourage governments to more carefully
navigate their First Amendment duties, and will dramatically reduce the
cost and quantity of litigation directed at governments—particularly municipalities—throughout the country. Furthermore, governments’
regulatory goals can be accomplished under the stricter content neutrality
regime; a context-sensitive approach is not required to achieve a desired
community character.214
The need for more certain judicial direction to guide local sign regulators is illustrated by the direction given by courts that have advocated
context-sensitive or category-based approaches. For example, the Rappa
context-sensitive approach, by allowing government officials to determine
the relative importance of signage at particular locations,215 appears to grant
significant administrative discretion over the subject matter of the sign.
The decision does not provide any decipherable standard for determining
the relative “importance” of a sign; determination of importance almost
certainly requires an analysis of the sign’s content. Who is to say, for example, that a political sign would be more important than an address sign in a
residential area?216 This argument parrots a First Amendment “vagueness”

213.
Scenic America has sided with municipal regulators on a significant amount of
billboard litigation, including, most recently, Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,
644 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2011); the organization has filed amicus curiae briefs in numerous
other cases. See generally SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org (last visited on Sept. 6, 2012).
Scenic America receives most of its litigation resources pro bono, but the organization’s
Executive Director estimates that it has spent a billable-hour equivalent of over $2 million
in recent years, and that some of the organization’s state-based affiliates have spent in excess
of $1 million on litigation in recent years. E-mail from Mary Tracy, Executive Director,
Scenic America, to author (Apr. 29, 2012, 10:46 EST) (on file with author).
214.
See generally MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, at 48–75 (proposing a model
ordinance which is entirely content neutral, yet accomplishes the regulatory goals of a model
community).
215.
Rappa, 18 F.3d at 1064.
216.
A similar problem arose in Melrose where the city ordinance attempted to distinguish between “advertising,” “business,” and “identification” signs; an identification sign
allowed the display of the name of an individual or organization located at the premises,
while a business sign was one that “directs attention to a business, organization, profession
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or “prior restraint” argument, but both of these concepts are inherently
related to the problem of content neutrality; if the regulation is unconstitutionally vague, it almost certainly will authorize an administrative official to
discriminate against certain messages based on content or viewpoint.217
Thus, the Rappa model opens new questions that it does not answer, leaving
local governments to engage in guesswork to determine whether their findings of the importance of certain subjects of speech sufficiently meet the
standard.
A category-based approach to content neutrality raises similar uncertainties. A common local ordinance provision provides special regulations
for “political signs,” and courts that have accepted a category-based approach have upheld these special regulations.218 Again, however, upholding
such category-based regulations leaves open a variety of questions about
how signs might be categorized. For example, it may be somewhat obvious
that the category of political signs includes signage related to an individual’s candidacy for elected office. But does a store window posting of a
newspaper cartoon featuring a likeness of an elected official constitute
political speech? Furthermore, to what level of abstraction in the broader
taxonomy of sign types might such categories constitutionally go? Could
regulations of political signs be broken out into “election” signs relating to a
specific election and “advocacy” signs relating to a general political philosophy or theory? Does a political sign placed by a corporate entity even fall
under the broader umbrella of “noncommercial” speech? The courts have
not provided sufficient definition on any of these points, thus leaving local
governments to feel their way toward a constitutional sign regulation under
the category-based approach.
Meanwhile, an alternative framework that relies on a strict content
neutrality standard leaves few questions; even if it does not completely
resolve the uncertainty, such an approach can give local governments much
greater confidence in their regulatory approaches.219 Examples of government entities that enacted ordinances lacking in category-based or contextsensitive distinctions, and that had those ordinances treated favorably by
or industry located upon the premises where the sign is displayed . . . .” Melrose, 613 F.3d at
384. The Court upheld the ordinance, following its earlier holding in Rappa. Id. at 383.
217.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“[I]t is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”).
218.
See, e.g., H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 622 (6th Cir.
2009).
219.
See ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, INC. & D.B. HARTT, INC., A FRAMEWORK FOR ONPREMISE SIGN REGULATIONS 15 (2009) (“When local governments enact sign regulations
that are entirely—or even predominantly—content-neutral, courts have little difficulty
upholding the regulations against a legal challenge.”).
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courts, are numerous.220 Courts in these cases have demanded a high degree
of content neutrality that has a clear direction and comprehensible standards to municipal ordinance drafters, providing models for other
municipalities to emulate in the ordinance drafting processes.221 By requiring sign regulations to abide by the content-neutral “time, place, and
manner” standards, little flexibility is left for government to regulate on the
basis of content, thus deterring litigation.
Those courts and authors advocating a functional approach to content
neutrality frequently do so under the guise that a municipality would be
unable to achieve its aesthetic or other regulatory goals under a stricter
content neutrality regime, or that a less stringent regime would be more
“workable.”222 This suggestion is false, as demonstrated by the fact that a
number of commentators,223 and an increasing number of communities
throughout the nation, have developed sign regulations that approach complete content neutrality.224 There is hardly a sign regulation problem faced
by a municipality today that cannot be addressed with a content-neutral
solution.225 This fact alone undercuts the argument that a local government
would be unable to achieve its regulatory purposes without the added help
220.
See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 594 F.3d 94 (2d Cir.
2010); Maldonado v. Morales, 556 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2009); Covenant Media of S.C., LLC
v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007); La Tour v. City of Fayetteville, Ark.,
442 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2006); Am. Legion Post 7 v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 (4th
Cir. 2001). Note that many of these cases still dealt with ordinances that contained the
troubled commercial/noncommercial and on-/off-premises distinctions.
221.
See, e.g., G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1071, 1077–78 (upholding a municipal
ordinance that, among other things, banned “pole signs” on the grounds that the “restriction
[was] not a ‘law[] that by [its] terms distinguish[es] favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.’ ” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 643 (1994))). The court also upheld a provision for “event signs” on the basis that
an event sign regulation did not relate to the content of the sign, but rather to a temporal
limitation on the display of signs during and around times of events. G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436
F.3d at 1077; see also Am. Legion Post 7, 239 F.3d at 608 (upholding a city ordinance that
restricted the size of flags that could be displayed; the court specifically stated that regulation of size of a display is a content-neutral mode of regulation).
222.
See ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, INC. & D.B. HARTT, INC., supra note 219, at 15–16.
223.
See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 33, at 79 (discussing the way in which a sign
regulation can avoid the on-premises/off-premises distinction); see also MANDELKER ET AL.,
supra note 14; ANDREW D. BERTUCCI & RICHARD B. CRAWFORD, U.S. SIGN COUNCIL,
MODEL ON-PREMISE SIGN CODE 7 (2011), available at http://www.usscfoundation.org/
USSCModelOn-PremiseSignCode.pdf.
224.
A number of municipalities throughout the nation have adopted completely
content-neutral ordinances, including Melbourne, Florida; Mesa, Arizona; and West Hollywood, California. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Ordinances, LAND USE L., http://law.wustl.edu/
landuselaw/ordinances.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
225.
See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 14, at 47–75 (providing a model sign ordinance); see also CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2 (review of numerous
content-neutral options for dealing with common local sign regulation issues).
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of courts employing a less-stringent content neutrality standard226 that
would potentially infringe upon First Amendment rights and expose the
municipality to litigation. For example, a municipality could easily have
regulations limiting the height, size, materials, and lighting of signage—and
still maintain an attractive character—with no mention of message in the
ordinance.227
Thus, practical aspects of sign regulation—reduction of litigation risk
and assurance of continued enforceability of sign ordinances—provide
cause enough alone for more consistent application of the content neutrality principle by the courts. Regulatory certainty and the fact that contentbased regulations are unnecessary to the achievement of aesthetic character
goals provide sufficient grounds for a more rigorous content neutrality
analysis. As long as courts are willing to provide flexibility in the content
neutrality standard, governments—particularly municipalities—will be
willing and able to forget the First Amendment requirements placed upon
them in their regulatory capacity. There is significant opportunity for coexistence between the First Amendment rights of individual sign owners to
post their desired messages and the protection of the aesthetic environmental interests of communities.

CONCLUSION
Governments—particularly at the local level—have relied heavily on
context-sensitive and category-based regulations to accomplish their aesthetic regulatory goals under the assumption that creating a visual
environment free of noxious signage would be impossible without some
degree of content regulation. However, these regulations have fallen prey to
sign owners and billboard companies seeking to exercise their First
Amendment rights to post and display speech. The practice of employing
context-sensitive or category-based regulations, which has been endorsed by
some courts as sufficiently within the realm of constitutional regulation,
continues to carry significant legal risk and attract costly litigation. Employing such risky strategies for regulating signage leaves open the
possibility that local sign ordinances will be struck down, thus creating a
regulatory vacuum in which signs and billboards could be placed with impunity; such an outcome would be destructive for the local visual
environment. This Note offers support for a speech regulation jurisprudence that uniformly applies a strict standard of content neutrality without
exception, because such an approach would create a more consistent regula-

226.
227.

See Rappa v. New Castle Cnty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1064 (3d Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., CONNOLLY & WYCKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-9 tbl. 6-2.
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tory environment that would leave governments less exposed to litigation
and lessen the potential for aesthetic and environmental degradation.
Requiring governments to comply with the strictest demands of content neutrality instead of fishing for the proper level of content neutrality
under the context-sensitive and category-based approaches would produce
significantly greater predictability for regulators, which would lead to
greater certainty in aesthetic protection efforts. Although governments
have been forced to deal with challenges by sign plaintiffs who have taken
on the more literal view of content neutrality in order to strike down sign
regulations, municipal compliance with the more literal view provides the
most sound answer to these challenges. The non-necessity of content-based
distinctions to achieve almost any sign control goals undermines arguments
that the content neutrality doctrine should be more flexible. Even though a
more literal content neutrality jurisprudence would impose greater demands on municipal regulators to design truly content-neutral ordinances,
it would provide a reliable standard for local regulators and sign owners.
And in the long run, such an approach would clear up the confusion that
has developed because of circuit splits and the courts’ seemingly flexible
approach to the First Amendment’s content neutrality requirement.

